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THE DEVELOPME�\JT OF THE ENGLISH USE
FROM THE CONQUEST TO THE REIGN OF HENRY VIII
The Norman Conquest (1066) signified a new epoch in
the evolution of the law of succession of real property in
England.

The introduction of the Norman brand of feudalism

necessitated a revision in the primitive Anglo-Saxon mode

.
1
o f succession.

The feudal system was necessarily dependent upon a
stable chain of land ownership, and thus, the principle of
primogeniture emerged as the dominant form of land conveyance.

2

By the end of the twelfth century it was held that,
"God alone, and not man, can make an heir.113 Land pur

chased during one's lifetime could be freely transferred,
but wills and deathbed grants of property were forbidden.
W. S. Holdsworth states that, "To recognize the interest
of anyone not actually seised or entitled to a definite
estate in land would be to encourage the evasion of obli
gations upon the due performance of which a feudal society
was based.
The separation of the lay and ecclesiastical courts
complicated the law of succession as they drew a distinction
between real and personal property.

Laws pertaining to

land were molded by royal courts of common law and equity,
whereas laws relevant to succession of chattels were based
on Roman and canonical law as interpreted by the

2
ecclesiastical courts.

While testation of real property

was prohibited by conunon law, the church encouraged the
devise of personal property, and taught that dying without
a will was similar to dying unconfessed.5 Thus, the medi
eval concept of the testament was developed through the
church and was exclusive of real property.
Despite the conunon law prohibition of transferring
lands in any way other than by livery of seisin, and
despite the insistence of transferring land at death through
primogeniture, a method of conveying land from one man to
another for the "use" of the first man or a third party
developed shortly after the Conquest.

The use was a method

whereby the foeffor (landowner) vested the legal title of
his land in one or more feoffees with the understanding that
the land would be administered for the occupation and ben
efit of the feoffor or his appointee, the cestui que use.
By the sixteenth century there were many means of creating

a use including feoffment to uses;� 6

implication of a use

in conunon law conveyances such as fine, recovery, lease,
7

oral or written agreement through
bargain and sale; and through a resulting use.8 The use
release, and grant;

was highly flexible because it was not directly affected by
the common law doctrine of livery of seisin, and the use was
highly desirable as, "uses could create equitable possessory
estates, and equitable remainders, for years, for life, in
fee tail and in fee simple corresponding to legal estates

3
and remainders.119

As we shall see, the use enabled one to

escape the burdens of feudal incidents, to devise land, and
to create future interests.

The courts of connnon law

recognized only the legal interest of the feoffee to uses
and did not require him to fulfill the terms of the use,
but the Court of Chancery recognized the equitable interest
of the cestui que use and compelled the feoffee to grant
the beneficiary of the use access to the land and rents of
the legal estate, to convey the legal estate according to
the instructions of the cestui que use, and to defend the
10
legal estate against the claims of third parties.
There
fore, "Conveyances in uses were like privileged places or
liberties; for as there the law doth not run, so upon such
conveyances the law could not take hold.1111 The use
brideed the gap between real and personal property as it
provided the landowner a means of distributing his land
which was as complete as that of any other type of property.
The use was employed in a variety of circumstances in
the Middle Ages.

Before departure upon foreign exploits,

many Crusaders would convey their lands to friends upon

.
.
. the form o f a use. 12
various
cond"itions
cast in

In order

to comply with poverty vows, Franciscan friars would trans
fer legal property titles to a feoffee while retaining the
benefits of and the right to use the land.

This practice

was consecrated by the papacy in the 1279 Bull Exilt qui
seminat.

4
Uses were created in the event of bad guardianship.

A

statute passed in 1275 declared that when a guardian proved
to be fraudulent, wardship would be transferred to another
"to hold for the use of" the infant.13 Uses enabled land
owners to escape many incidences of tenure, such as
wardships, marriages, and fines, for these obligations
arose only upon the transference of the legal estate, and
if there were multiple feoffees, the legal estate would not
expire at the death of the feoffer.14 Some utilized the
use to avoid payment of debts or to circumvent statutes of
15
mortmain.
Statutes enacted in 1377, 1379, 1448, and 1504
somewhat restricted fraudulent practices through uses but
were unable to eliminate them.

In 1392 making gifts to

corporations through uses which violated restrictions of
statutes of mortmain were prohibited.

Finally, uses were

incorporated as a means of devising property.

A testator

was able to convey his estate to others and designate in
his will what persons, purposes, and times that the estate
Thus, through the will and the use
16
one could create interests realized in futuro.
Though
would be put to use.

the use served many functions, the ability to avoid feudal
dues, to convey property by devise, and to create future
interests were the most important.
From the preceding paragraph we can infer that the use
not only provided a highly elastic form of land conveyance,
but that the use permitted several channels through which

5

fraud could be perpetrated.

The common law courts of the

fifteenth century were unable to act against the use
because laws regulating the use were insufficient to deal
with the situation which arose from the use.

The common

law courts held that wills of reality were illegal and
refused to recognize the position of the cestui que use.
M. M. Bigelow states that the common law judges "would not
in any way, by direct mandate or through damages for breach
of trust, compell the feoffee to carry out the terms of
the devise.11 17
In the absence of judgment by the common law courts,
the Court of Chancery increasingly arbitrated disputes
arising from uses.

Though the Chancery was involved in

cases involving uses as early as 1350, it was not until the
first half of the fifteenth century that the chancellor's
jurisdiction became firmly established over the feoffee
who failed to comply to the terms of the use, and that the
rules defining the nature of relief were regularly system
ized.18

The chancellor, operating on the premise that men

should honor their word and should not be allowed to profit
from a breach of faith, recognized the cestui que use as
having a rightful claim to the benefits of the land in ques
tion.19

The Chancery enforced the right_of the cestui que

use's equitable ownership through fines and imprisonment.
W. S. Holdsworth stnns up the advantages of the Chancery's
jurisdiction of cases involving uses by stating that,

6
Whether we look at the ethical principles upon which
the chancellor interfered, or at the procedure of the
court of chancery, or at its freedom from fixed forms
of action, we can see that the chancellor and his
court were as strikingly fitted as the common law and
the common law courts were unfitted, to assume juris
diction over the use.20
The Crown recognized the negative effects of the use
before the reign of Henry VIII, and there were some efforts,
through statute, to alleviate them.

In 1485 the cestui que

use was given the power to initiate a writ of formedon
against anyone who was receiving his profits from the land.
This statute is exemplary of the general trend to vest the
.
· the cestui· que use. 21 In 1483
rights o f 1ega1 ownersh"ip in
a statute gave the cestui que use the right to dispose of a
legal estate.

This statute was defective because it did

not remove the power of the feoffee to dispose of the legal
estate, and thus, considerable confusion arose from the
possibility of two people disposing of the same estate.
Nevertheless, the statute is important because it foreshad
ows the Statute of Uses, and it points to many problems
arising from the use.

Other statutes pertaining to uses

were passed in 1487, 1489, and 1504, but they did not enable
the Crown to collect rights of wardship and marriage or
escheat and forfeiture on a large scale basis, and were
.
.
22
theref ore inconsequential.
By the reign of Henry VIII the use was an established
and protected mechanism which afforded the landowner a chan
nel through which he could evade feudal incidents.

Bigelow

7

states that:
Feoffment to use had cut the nerve of tenure; the
feudal lord had lost his revenues; he could not
enforce his right to forfeitures, escheats, wardships,
marriages and the like, - not against the feoffor
because he had parted with the title to the lands in
question; not against the feoffee to uses, for he
virtually had nothing in the the lands; not against
the cestui gtie use, for no feudal tie bound him to the
injured lord.z3
Uses also robbed the Crown of revenue, and as Henry VIII was
desperately in need of finances, and as Parliament was
becoming unsympathetic to his requests after having been
pressured to resolve Henry's matrimonial problems and to
instigate undesired policies of church reform, it was
decided that the most lucrative channel of revenue would be
through the enforcement of feudal dues, a valid source of
income already at disposal.

Therefore, Henry and his court

lawyers concentrated upon devising a means to collect the
dues which were avoided by the use for, as Theodore
Plunkett states, "whoever gains by the arra.in3ment (uses)
the Crown is sure to loose.1124 As we shall see, between
1529 and

1535 Henry VIIIand his lawyers made various

attempts to initiate legislation of a statute which would
eliminate the loophole that the use provided through the
separation of the legal and equitable titles of property
ownership.

The Statute of Uses (1535) was not only the

culmination of these efforts; it is the basis of our modern
definition of property.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE STATUTE OF USES AND
ITS EFFECTS ON ENGLISH LAW
Although the subject of uses was debated in virtually
every session of the Reformation Parliament:

although the

Crown and the peers of England entered into a treaty con
cerning the right to convey land through uses:

although

statesmen such as Sir Thomas More and Thomas Cromwell were
involved with the political aspects of procuring limitations
over uses:

and although attempts to secure jurisdiction

over uses set connnon law judges against judges of Chancery,
there is little material surviving for the modern historian
to trace the evolution of the Statute of Uses.

Unfortu

nately, the Connnons' Journals do not extend to the period
in which the statute was conceived, the extant fragments
of the Lords' Journals make no mention of the statute, and
the roll of Parliament affords no significant information
pertaining to the passage of the Statute of Uses.25 Thus,
legal historians must depend upon proposed draft bills of
statutes seeking to regulate uses, records of cases related
to uses tried in the courts of common law, a few letters
and papers which have survived, and occasional accounts of
contemporary observers in attempting to reconstruct the
events which led to the passage of the Statute of Uses.
Many historians have dealt with the causes and effects
of the Statute of Uses, yet few have offered comprehensive
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interpretations.

Sir Francis Bacon and Edward Coke were

among the first lawyers to give readings upon the statute.
Others such as J. A. Froude, A. F. Pollard, and F. W.
Maitland have endeavored exegesis of the statute with vary
ing results.

The most widely accepted and the most

comprehensive treatment of the Statute of Uses was presented
by W. S. Holdsworth in his multivolumed work, A History of
English Law.

Holdsworth's basic thesis that the statute

was the product of efforts of a strong willed king who
bargained first with the nobility, and later with the common
lawyers in order to secure passage of the statute remained
above criticism until the later part of the 1960's.26 Since
then historians such as E. W. Ives, J. H. W. Bean, and
Stanford E. Lehmberg have challenged Holdsworth's view.
Citing evidence that Holdsworth was unaware of, these later
historians posit that the Crown first appealed to the land
owning class to compromise upon the issue of uses, and after
the Crown's ventures proved unsuccessful, the Crown sought
to resolve the issue through judicial action.

The Crown was

able to pit the comraon law judges against Chancery to obtain
a decision in Lord Dacre's case (1534-35) which nullified
certain uses and precipitated instability among owners of
real property.

Due to the precarious state of property

ownership, the Commons was thus forced to pass the Statute
of Uses.
The purpose of the first part of this paper is to
interpret the events leading to the passage of the Statute
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of Uses while o�fering a synthesis, and, in some places,
an expansion of ideas proposed by divergent schools of
thought in order to offer an accurate account of the
evolution of the statute.

A second section of this paper

will assess the short and long term effects of the Statute
of Uses.

Criteria for judgment of the significance of the

statute will include both the degree to which Henry VIII
accomplished his purposes for pursuing land reform and the
unanticipated consequences which the Statute of Uses stim
ulated.
Between 1529 and 1536 the Crown initiated a large
scale attack against the separation of the equitable and
the legal titles of property through uses because this
division of titles promoted secret conveyances and robbed
the king of feudal incidents.

During the years 1529 to

1539 the Crown sought to alleviate the abuses caused by
conveying land through uses by statutory reform.

According

to Holdsworth, the first of these attempts was a 1529 draft
bill which "would have at once revolutionized and simpli
fied the law.1127 The draft bill proposed that: For all
persons who were not peers there was to be only one type of
estate in land, a fee simple.

No uses were valid unless

they were enrolled by an officer of the Court of Common
Pleas.

The deed was to be read and recorded in the parish

church where the land was located.

The lands of the peers

were subject to feudal dues on both equitable and legal
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estates.

No one could buy these lands without the king's

license, and once sold through ordinary conveyance, the
purchaser was to hold in fee simple.

The lands of nobil

ity within the rank of baron could be entailed, devised,
and settled.28
The 1529 draft bill is of questionable value and
origin.

Holdsworth feels that the bill was part of an

agreement between the king and nobility, whereas Ives
asserts that the draft bill, "looks less like an attempt of
the government to simplify and reform the land law than a
well intentioned but inexperienced proposal emanating from
a private individual with a grievance about concealed
2
titles.11 9 While allowing for the fact that the format of
the draft bill was similar to other government bills of the
period, Ives states that the bill proposed a complex and
impracticable scheme of registration of conveyances, that
it did not include legislation relating to primer seisin,
and it was solely an attempt to alleviate abuses arising
from secret conveyances contrived by entails, uses and for
gery.30

The proposal which gives the bill its unusual

character, a proviso permitting noblemen exclusive right of
entail, from which Holdsworth claims that the Crown compro
mised with nobility, is not part of the main body of the
bill.

In any event, the bill did not pass the Commons, and

there were no attempts to alter or reintroduce it.

If spon

sored by the government, the 1529 draft bill was probably
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not an integral component of the government's plan to remedy
the evils of uses, and the bill was not part of a compro
mise between king and nobility.

At most, the draft bill

was a predecessor of the Statute of Enrollments which was
enacted in 1536.31

. . .
.
A separate document, initiate
d in 1529 , 32 is
· of more

importance to the evolution of the Statute of Uses.

This

document is an agreement between Henry VIII, Lord Chan
cellor Thomas More, and thirty peers.

In twenty-three

detailed articles, this document establishes the king's
right to receive a fraction of feudal incidents in return
for allowing the landowning class the flexibility inherent
in the use.

The compromise stipulated that land not set

tled by use was to be subjugated to feudal incidents, but
where land had been devised by use, the king was to have
rights to only one-third of the incidents of tenure.

The

Crown was to have the wardship of all infant heirs of
tenants-in-chief, regardless of whether the land was held
in use or was a legal estate.

Heirs who were of full age

were required to pay the king one-half a year's profits
upon suing out livery of th�ir lands.33 The agreement
between the Crown and the peers represents a compromise
whereby the king surrendered one-half or two-thirds of his
legal entitlement in return for the assurance that the
remainder would be duly paid.
The agreement contained concessions to all landowners,
but the nobility stood to benefit most.

Article 19 of the
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agreement states that:
the Kings highness is pleased that it shall be
enacted that every of the said noble men, and all
other his subjects and their heirs and successors of
whom any lands or tenements be or shall be holden by
knights service, shall have full benefit and profit of
the wardship of the third part of the whole of the
same lands as tenements holden to the King's subjects
as the case shall require as said by the Articles as
devised for the Kings highness, his heirs and succes
sors of lands and tenements of him not holden in
chief. 3 4
Thus, the compromise granted both the king and the peerage
the right to collect feudal dues.

As this concession was

made at the expense of all other landowners of the realm,
it promised to be the source of opposition in the Commons.
Although there is controversy over when the agreement
was first introduced in the Commons, most scholars believe
that it was initiated in the third session of the Reforma
tion Parliament which began on January 15, 1532.35 It is
important to note that the draft bill submitted by Cromwell
contained several alterations of the agreement between the
Crown and nobility.

Article 19 of the compromise was

totally deleted from the text of the draft bill'.

Further

more, instead of asking for one-third of the feudal
incidents, Cromwell probably submitted a bill calling for
one-half.

There is no surviving draft of this proposed

legislation, but Edward Hall reports that "everyman might
make his will of the halfe of his lande, so that he left
the other halfe to the heyre by discent,1136 and adds that
he had been "credibly informed" that the Crown would accept
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a third or a quarter.

It therefore appears that the Crown

usurped the agreed right of the lessor lords to demand
feudal dues in order to increase the chances of the draft
bill passing Commons, and that the Crown requested one-half
share of incidents with the intention of "compromising"
with the Commons for one-third, the fraction the Crown ini
tially desired.
According to Chapuys, the draft bill was the source of
"strange words against King and Council" when it was read
37
Most members of the Commons held land
in the Commons.
subject to tenure, and the bill before them would nullify
much of the benefits of the use.

Therefore, the Commons

remained adamant in opposition to the draft bill, and as a
result, precipitated a direct encounter with Henry VIII.
Coming to present the Supplication against the Ordinaries,
members of Commons were greeted with an ultimatum warning
against opposition to the bill on feudal incidents.

Henry

reportedly declared:
I have sent to you a byll concernynge wards and primer
season, in the which thynges I am greatly wronged:
Wherefore I have offered you reason as I thynke, yea,
and so thynketh all the Lordes, for they have set
their handes to the book: Therefore I assure you, if
you wyll not take some reasonable ende now when it is
offered, I wyll search out the extremitie of the lawe,
and then wyll I not offre you so much agayne. 38
Parliament was prorogued ten days after Henry VIII expressed
his displeasure at the reluctance of the Commons to pass the
draft bill.
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The draft bill was reintroduced in the fourth session
of Parliament where it fared substantially better, receiving
two readings.

Nevertheless, progress was much slower than

the Crown desired, and as a result, Henry temporarily aban
doned attempts to regulate uses through Parliamentary
legislation.

The Crown now pursued control of uses by

seeking to obtain jurisdiction over them in the courts of
law.
The Crown's decision to seek jurisdiction over uses was
probably initiated after Cromwell received information about
a settlement made by Thomas Fiennes Lord Dacre of the South
which promised to deprive the Crown of all feudal incidents.
This information was obtained by Henry Polsted, a servant of
Lord Dacre who was partially responsible for composing Lord
Dacre's will.39 Thus, when Lord Dacre died, the Crown was
well prepared to challenge his settlement.
On September 9, 1533 Thomas Fiennes, Lord Dacre, died
leaving his estate, which included holdings in thirteen
counties to his eighteen year old grandson, Thomas.

As the

majority of Lord Dacre's lands were held by feoffees to use,
and as the settlement of Lord Dacre's estate completely
robbed the king of feudal dues, the royal escheators
declared the settlement collusive in their inquisition post
mortem.

As a result, the Crown sued for lost revenues in

the Exchequer Chamber during the Trinity term of 1534.
Royal lawyers asserted that Dacre's settlement was void not
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only because his will was a deliberate attempt to defraud
the king of wardship, but also because of the general principle that land could not be devised by common law.40 On
January 9, 1534 jurors of the Exchequer Chamber reached the
decision that the will of Lord Dacre was made with intent to
defraud the king of incidents and declared it void.

At this

time the feoffees of Lord Dacre appealed the Exchequer's
decision in Chancery through a method known as a "traverse."
The Chancery heard the case during the Easter term of 1535.
The suit was the source of much contention, and initially
the judges were evenly divided despite pressure from Crom
well and Lord Chancellor Audley to conform to the Crown's
wishes.

At this time, "the Kyng called the Iudges and the

best learned men of his Realme and thei disputed this
matter in the Chauncery, and agreed that lande could not be
4
willed by common law. ,. l After deliberating the Dacre case
once more, the judges complied with Henry's wishes and
upheld the verdict of the Exchequer Chamber.

Thus, all

evidence supports the fact that Chancery's verdict in
Dacre's case was obtained through incessant pressure from
the Crown, applied often by Henry VIII himself.42 The
decision by Chancery to repudiate the Dacre settlement is
monumental because it contradicted the precedents of the
courts of common law and royal administrative policy since
the late fourteenth century, and because the Chancellor, in
asserting that a use was a collusive attempt to deprive the
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Crovm of feudal revenues, abandoned precedents established
over the last century and a half in order to promote a rule
.
.
43
based pure 1 y upon extra- 1ega 1 consid erations.
The decision in the Dacre case threatened to undermine
the basis of English property settlements.

Neither the

king nor his subjects were content with the outcome of the
case because both parties were susceptible to losses and
legal entanglements as the laws regarding property were now
quite unstable.

The Crown was not fully satisfied with the

outcome of the Dacre case because the ruling was insuffi
cient to secure mandatory payment of feudal incidents.
Administrative delays and possible reversal of the decision
in the Dacre case were forseen as royal officials would
have to prove through individual post mortem investigations
that collusion was intended by those who were accused of
avoiding wardship.

Furthermore, the Dacre case provided for

the collection of wardship and marriage, but rights accruing
when the heir reached legal age such as primer seisin, liv
ery, and relief were not ensured by the ruling.44 As a
result of the Dacre decision those who held land belonging
to the Crown forfeited the right to will their land if they
had an heir under age, and they had no course of action
against who chose to will land held in use.

Thus, from the

standpoint of the Crown and from the standpoint of the land
owners, passage of a statute detailing the rights and
obligations of uses was imperative.
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Although both the Crown and the landowners were
adversely affected by the decision in Lord Dacre's case,
the landowners' situation was much more desperate than that
of the Crown.

Consequently, when Henry VIII opened the

last session of the Reformation Parliament on February 4,
1 5 36, he was confident that the battle against uses was won.
Therefore, Henry proposed measures substantially more
severe than his original plan of compromise with the nobil
ity.

These proposals constitute two draft bills45 which

contained provisions which would resolve the problem created
by the division of the equitable and the legal title of
property while retaining the use as a means to transfer
land.

The extent of Henry's control over the passage of

this legislation is evidenced by the fact these draft bills
differed in wording, but not in meaning, from the Statute
of Uses that the Parliament enacted.46
The Statute of Uses is an exemplary model of sixteenth
century legal draftsmanship.

The quality of the draftsman

ship of the Statute of Uses led Sir Francis Bacon to
proclair.i that:
is the most perfectly and exactly
This Statute
conceived and penned of any law in the book, induced
with the most declaring and persuading pre�mble,
consisting and standing with the most foreseeing and
circumspect savings and provisos, and lastly, the best
pondered in all the words and clauses of any statute
that I find. 47
The preamble to the Statute of Uses contains a list of
grievances and inconveniences caused by uses.

Holdsworth
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states that, "Like the preambles of other statutes of this
period, it is far from being a sober statement of historical
fact.

Rather it is an official statement of the numerous

good reasons which had induced the government to pass such a
wise statute

Many of grievances cited in the pre-

amble originated from two memoranda, 'Inconvenience for suf
ferance of uses' and 'Damna usum' ; 49 which were composed for
Cromwell and Audley.

Central to the statute's preamble is

the grievance that:
The lords have lost their wards, marriages,reliefs,
heriots, aids pur faire filz chivalier and phr fil
marier ... The king's highness hath lost t e prof
its and advantages of the lands of persons attainted,
and of the lands craftyly put in feoffments to uses
of aliens born, and also the profits of waste for a
year and a day of felons attainted, and the lords
their escheats thereof.SO
The effect of the preamble was to present a convincing, well
detailed argument against uses which asserts that uses
adversely affected virtually every class of Englishmen. Uses
deprived the lords of wardship and feudal incidents, women
of dowers, the king of collecting forfeitures, and the
public because of the secrecy of the conveyance and its
ability to avoid registration in a court of record.
The main body of the Statute of Uses then endeavors to
remedy these evils.

While neither invalidating previous

uses nor eliminating future conveyances to uses, the statute
severely undermined the benefits of the use.

Fundamentally,

the statute executed the use by converting the equitable
title of the cestui que use into a legal estate by

20
transferring the seisin and the legal title from the feoffee
to the cestui que use.51 This governing idea of the Statute
of Uses reads:
Where any person or persons stand or be siesed . . . to
the use, confidence, or trust of any other person or
persons or to any body politic . . . that in every such
case all and every such use in fee simple, fee tail,
for term of life or for years . . . or in remainder or
reverter shall stand and be seised . . . in lawful
seisin estate and possession of the same . . . lands
. to all intents of and such like estates as they
had or shall have in the use.52
The next two clauses of the statute declare that in cases
where multiple persons are jointly seised to the use of one
of them, or where persons are seised to herediments to the
use that other persons would enjoy the rents of the hered
iments; the legal estates will be vested in the cestui que
5
use to the extent of his interest. 3 Clauses 4-7 stipulate
that a wife who held lands settled jointly by her and her
husband or who was the beneficiary of a use held jointly
with her husband must choose between collecting from the
joint settlement or suing for dower.

Clause 9 states that

all devises made before May 1, 1536 were to remain valid.
Clause 10 establishes May 1, 1536 as the date from whence
the king may collect primer seisin, livery, ouster le main,
fines for alienation, reliefs, or heriots from the uses of
land converted into legal estates by the statute.

From the

same date the lords were to be entitled to fines reliefs
and heriots from estates executed by the statute.

Clause

11 ensures the cestui que use all rights of legal action

21
against feoffees which he possessed before the act.54
Before the Statute of Uses if Martin enfoeffed Tim to
hold the University of Richmond to the use of John, then
Tim would hold the legal title of the University and John
would possess the equitable title which would afford John
the occupation and benefits of the estate, but not the
liabilities such as tenure which were associated with the
legal title.

Furthemore, John, the cestui que use, would

have the privilege of disposing of the University of Rich
mond by will.

After the Statute of Uses was passed, the

statute would execute the use, and therefore, Tim would
become merely a conduit in a transaction in which John
would be granted the legal and the equitable titles of the
University.

Thus, John, as full owner of the legal estate,

would be assessed for all feudal incidents and would be
subject to forfeiture for treason.

In addition, poor John

would lose his right of disposing of the University of
Richmond by will_SS
The Statute of Uses was supplemented by the Statute
of Enrollments (1536) in order to prevent secret oral trans
actions of land through bargain and sale.

The Statute of·

Enrollments required that every bargain and sale of a free
hold or inheritance estate be made in writing, put under
seal, and enrolled within six months of the date of the deed
in either a Court of Record or in the county where the lands
56
are located.
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The Statute of Enrollments is a weak version of a draft
proposed at the same time as the Statute of Uses.

The pro

posed draft was a much more comprehensive and thoroughgoing
scheme of land registration than the Statute of Enrollments,
and it promised to establish an efficient system of enroll
ment which gave enrolled documents the same force and effect
as evidence acknowledged before a Court of Record.

Holds

worth remarks that, "The causes which render a scheme of
registration so difficult today are largely the result of
the failure to pass the bill proposed in 1536.1157 The more
comprehensive scheme of registration was not as ardently
pursued by the Crown as the Statute of Uses because its
financial interests were not as acutely involved.
Thus, the Crown's battle to acquire the feudal inci
dents which were deprived it through uses lasted the length
of the Reformation Parliament.

.

Between 1529 and 1533 the

Crown attempted to obtain jurisdiction of uses through
Parliamentary legislation.

When Parliament proved unsympa

thetic to the Crown's desires, Henry VIII abandoned efforts
to legislate a statute regulating uses, and instead turned
to the judiciary for support.

Henry both threatened and

bribed the Chancery in order to gain sanction of his ideas
regarding uses.

Then through Lord Dacre's case he success

fully managed to establish a ruling which negated the terms
of the Dacre will.

The Dacre decision overturned prior

Chancery rulings supporting the cestui que use,and·destroyed
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the basis of most proper�y settlements in England by declar
ing that a use which deprived the king of his feudal
incidents was illegal.

The irresolute condition of land

settlements frightened landowners and made passage of a
statute defining property ownership and obligations imper
ative.

As a result, the Crown was able to surpass the terms

of its 1529 compromise with the nobility and demand all
feudal dues payable rather than one third.

The Statute of

Uses not only stipulated that incidents of tenure be thus
paid to the Crown, but prohibited the right to devise real
property by will.

The immediate effects of this legislation

were the transference of the jurisdiction of uses to the
courts of common law, impetus of landowners to join in the
agitation against the Crown which led to the Pilgrimage of
Grace, and the genesis of new forms of land conveyance based
upon deed rather than livery.
Most legal historians attempt to establish that the
Statute of Uses was passed due to the efforts of either the
common lawyers or the common law judges to obtain jurisdic
tion over cases involving uses.

It does not seem plausible

that the common lawyers would have desired such a change as
they often appeared before the Chancery, and since many of
them were landowners, the common lawyers stood to lose more
through the payment of tenure than they would have gained
through representing cases involving uses.

As many of the

benefits of conveyance through use were to be alleviated by
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the Statute of Uses, the lawyers would have anticipated a
decline in cases after the statute was passed.

Further

more, the common lawyers in the Corrnnons in 1536 amounted
to only one-fifth of the total body, and it is unlikely
that this relatively small percentage of lawyers could have
significantly altered the Corrnnons' general opposition to
legislation dealing with uses.58 A more plausible explana
tion is forwarded by E. W. Ives who asserts that the
government played upon the jealousy of the common law judges
for the considerable amount of litigation relating to land
which the Chancery received as a result of their protection
of the cestui que use.

Only the sergeants-at-law and the

common law judges benefitted from the transfer of uses to
the corrnnon law courts, as one gained a theoretical monopoly
of civil litigation and the other profited from an increase
in fees which the business transferred from the Chancery
brought.59 Thus, it is most likely that the common law
judges took advantage of royal backing to secure jurisdic
tion over uses.

It is important to note that the Lord

Chancellors during the debate and passage of the statute,
Thomas More and Thomas Audley, were common lawyers rather
than ecclesiastics.

Their support of royal wishes regarding

uses may be the result of their connections with the courts
of common law.
The landowners constitute the group most severely
affected by the Statute of Uses as, "the advantages secured
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by the king were diametrically opposed to their inter
ests.1160 Though the landowners retained the use and entail,
uses could no longer be incorporated as a means of devise,
and bargain and sale of freeholds and fees were required
to be publicly enrolled.

The loss of the devise and secret

land conveyances is one of the primary factors which pre
cipitated the participation of the landed gentry in the
Pilgrimage of Grace.61 Holdsworth states that:
The repeal of the Statute of Uses figures in the
demands of the rebels, and it appears from the depo
sitions of Aske and others that it was the abolition
of the power of devise which was one of the chief
causes which induced the landed gentry--the natural
leaders of the counties--to side with the rebels. 62
The extent to which the landed gentry participated in
the Pilgrimage of Grace signifies the general discontent
landowners experienced through the loss of their traditional
privileges of conveyance through uses.

Henry VIII could

not afford to alienate this powerful component of English
society because the landed gentry were integral to the
administration of justice and to the enforcement of policy
on the local levels of government, and they were politically
powerful in the House of Commons.

Therefore, after having

suppressed the Pilgrimage of Grace, and having obtained rev
enue from the dissolution of Monasteries {1536, 1539), Henry
conciliated· the gentry through gifts or sale of land and
through the Statute of Wills (1540).
The Statute of Wills, passed in the April-July 1540
session of Parliament, negated much of the royal gains
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accrued through the Statute of Uses.

The preamble to the

Statute of Wills details the inconveniences placed upon
subjects who were not able to:
use or exercise themselves according to their
estates, degrees, faculties, and qualities, as to
bear themselves in such wise as they may conveni
ently keep and maintain their hospitalities and
families, nor the good education and bringing up
of their lawful generations . . . they were not
able of their proper goods . . . to discharge their
debts, and after their degrees set forth and advance
their children and posterities. 63
To alleviate these problems, the statute conferred:
full and free liberty, power and authority to give,
dispose, will and devise, as well by his last will
and testament in writing or otherwise by any act or
acts lawfully executed in his life, all his . . .
herediments at his free will and pleasure to those
who held land by socage tenure. 6 4
Two-thirds of land held by knight service could be simi
larly devised.

Other clauses afforded tenants who were

lesser lords similar rights.

The right of the king to a

third of wardship, and of the other lords to wardship of a
third of the lands was retained.

Dower was to be deducted

from the two-thirds which was devisable.
constructed in written form.

Wills were to be

They were not required to be

signed by the testator, written in his hand, or witnessed.
The will was revocable and inoperative until the death of
the testator, but it was not applicable to property which
the testator acquired after the execution of the will. 6 5
In all circumstances the king retained his rights to primer
seisin, reliefs, fines for alienation, and other feudal
dues.

The Court of Wards, established through separate
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legislation in the same parliamentary session, was endowed
with administrative and judicial powers for the express
purpose of managing feudal revenues and enforcing the rights
of wardship and marriage, especially as affected by the
Statutes of Uses and Wills.
The effect of the Statute of Wills was to enact a sys
tem of land reform which closely mirrored the compromise
made between the Crown and the peers between 1529 and 1531.
The major difference between these two reforms is that
whereas the compromise assumed the continuous existence of
uses, the Statute of Wills is a concession by the king
granting his subjects the right to devise lands.66 A fur
ther concession, the right to devise socage lands, was also
allowed by the statute.

Thus, the land reforms which were

unacceptable to the Commons in 1532, and which were unac
ceptable to the Crown in 1536, now became the law in 1540.67
The Statute of Uses is significant because it marks the
first time in modern English history that the devise of a
legal freehold interest in land could be created by will to
begin in the future.68
Besides contributing to the landowners' involvement in
the Pilgrimage of Grace and hastening passage of the
Statute of Wills, the Statute of Uses introduced new forms
of conveyancing into the co!Illilon law.

These new types of

conveyancing gave the connnon law greater flexibility and
served to undermine obsolete forms of transfer such as
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primer seisin.

Furthermore, these conveyances permitted

interests to be created in future.

Among the more impor

tant modes of transfer created by the Statute of Uses are
conveyance to oneself, bargain and sale, lease and release,
covenant to stand seised, and springing and shifting inter
ests.

It is through the creation of these forms of

interests in land that the Statute of Uses achieved its
greatest impact upon English law and that the Statute of
Uses is of considerable interest to the modern legal his
torian.
Before the Statute of Uses a man could not convey an
interest to himself or his wife at common law.

After the

Statute this process was found to be valuable in changing
trustees or settling property on marriage.
A person seised in fee simple is able to convey the
property to trustees to the use of himself and his
heirs till marriage, and from after the marriage to
the use of himself for life, with remainder to the
use of his eldest and other sons successively in
tail, with remainder to his right heirs.69
This method of conveyance is still utilized in the formu
lation of modern wills.
The ba�gain and sale was perhaps the most important
form of conveyance in the period immediately preceding the
enactment of the Statute of Uses.

By the beginning of the

sixteenth century, it was commonly recognized that if Tim
bargained and sold his lands to John, but no connnon law
land conveyance was made, then Tim would be seised to the
use of John.

In the eyes of the connnon law, the bargain
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and sale did not pass seisin, but equity, following laws
relating to bargains and sales of chattels, established the
70
doctrine that a bargain and sale of land passed the use.
If Tim bargained and sold land to John after the Statute of
Uses, the use created would vest both the legal and the
equitable titles of land in John.

Thus, John would be

responsible for feudal dues, but now land could be trans
ferred at common law without the burdensome practices of
livery of seisin, entry, and attornment.71 The fact that
one could transfer land by a bargain and sale, which could
be oral and perhaps secret, necessitated the passage of the
Statute of Enrollments.72 Nevertheless, parties could
gather in a lawyer's office, draft a bargain and sale "deed,"
transfer money, and the purchaser would have possession of
the land as the Statute of Uses would automatically execute
the use. 73

William Walsh recognized the revolutionary

effect of the bargain and sale and remarked that, "The
Statute, therefore, may fairly be regarded as the means,
historically, by which conveyance by deed as distinguished
from conveyance by livery of seisin was introduced into
law.1174
An ingenious method was developed from the bargain and
sale whereby the conveyancers could effectively avoid both
livery of seisin and enrollment.

This method, lease and

release, was initiated by the vendor making a bargain and
sale for a year to the purchaser.

The bargain and sale
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would subsequently raise a use in the purchaser which would
be executed by the Statute of Uses.

The purchaser thus

received the legal title to the estate, but if a deed of
reversion was made to the purchaser, the transfer would
effectively escape enrollment as the estate created was not
one of freehold.

Furthermore, the estate would be validated

without the process of livery of seisin.

This loophole in

the Statute of Uses gained popularity in the later part of
the sixteenth century.

After the 1620 decision in Lutwich

v. Mitton that a legal title could be gained without entry,
the lease and release became the most popular form of land
conveyance, and it remained so until 1845.

Usually a bar

gain and sale for nominal consideration was negotiated, then
a release, dated one day later, was included in the same
document.
The covenant to stand seised is another method of
transferring title which was altered by the Statute of Uses.
The history of the covenant to stand seised dates from the
medieval period and has been the source of much legal con
troversy.

The fundamental question of the covenant's

validity lies in whether a use can arise in a transaction
not based upon "valuable" considerations such as money or
the equivalent, but upon "good" considerations such as mar
riage or blood relationship.

Before the sixteenth century,

equity would not interfere on behalf of the cestui que use
unless a valuable consideration was involved.75 Throughout
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the sixteenth century, the courts vascillated in their
interpretation of the covenant to stand seised.

Finally,

in the case of Gallard v. Gallard (1597), the Exchequer
Chamber reversed the Kings Bench and declared that a con
tract to make a use based upon natural love and affection
must be declared under seai.76 Thus, if John covenanted to
stand seised of land to the use of Joanne, his wife, a use
was created in Joanne, and was duly executed by the Statute
of Uses.

Joanne would become the legal owner of the estate

without completing the processes of livery of seisin,
enrollment, or of payment of valuable consideration.77
Before the Statute of Uses, a connnon law freehold
could not be created to connnence in futuro except by
reverter or remainder upon the termination of an estate and

.

.

the passing at the same time out o f a grantor. 78

However,

after the Statute of Uses, springing and shifting interests
could create future legal estates upon the happening of an
event or in derogation of a previous estate.

A springing

interest is an interest which can be created to begin at
the occurrence of an event such as a marriage, birth, or
specified date.

Thus, if Tim granted Ryland Hall to the

use of Frances and her heirs for the use of John and his
heirs from September 1, then there would be a resulting use
in Tim since no valuable consideration was passed, and Tim
would possess the legal estate as executed by the Statute
of Uses until September 1.

After Septe�ber 1, the legal
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estate would "spring" automatically to John.

A shifting

interest is an interest in an estate which passes from one
person to another at a future time as on the occurrence of
a particular event.

For example, a legal estate might be

conveyed through use by limiting the fee to John and his
heirs to the use of Tim and his heirs, with a proviso that
when Martin gets married, the land shall be to the use of
Hartin and his heirs.

In this case the use will "shift"

from Tim to Martin upon the event of Martin's marriage and
would terminate Tim's prior possession of the estate.

Both

springing and shifting interests may be raised by wills
where they are designated as executionary interests.

As

the springing and shifting interests took possession by
divesting a prior interest, they form a distinct facet of
the connnon law relating to future interests.79
The Statute of Uses further contributed to the flexi
bility of the disposition of property under connnon law by
establishing the power of appointment.

The power of

appointment is not itself a future interest, but it is a
devise which provides for the distribution of property in
futuro.80 The power of appointment could be conferred by
John making a bargain and sale to the use of Tim and his
heirs until and in default of Frances' exercise of a power
of appointment, and an exercise of such power to such per
sons as Frances might appoint by will or deed.81 The
Statute of Uses would vest a fee simple in Tim subject to
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Frances' exercise of power.

When Frances exercises the

power of appointment, the fee will automatically shift from
Tim to whosoever Frances designates as appointee(s).

Thus,

the power of appointment authorizes the person or persons
exercising such power to create a use which takes effect in
derogation of a prior use, in favor of such person, and for
such estate, as designated by the subsequent act of the
donee of the power.82
Thus, the Statute of Uses created new interests in land
which were not as strictly defined as previous common law
conveyances.

It has been seen that these new interests

imbued the law with flexibility and promoted more efficient
means of property transfer.

Nevertheless, the statute also

brought a serious problem into the law--that of holding land
in perpetuity.

Contingent remainders could be destroyed at

common law, but executory interests created by the Statute
of Uses could not, and thus, they could be created to vest
8
at some indefinite (and remote) period in the future. 3 The
prospect of rendering land inalienable was quickly attacked
in the courts, but early efforts to overrule perpetuities
created by executory interests proved unsuccessful. Finally,
in the Duke of Norfolk's Case (1681), the Rule Against Per
petuities was established.

This rule has subsequently been

the subject of much controversy and legal debate.

Simply

stated, the rule negates any "contingent" interest created
in a transfer which is not certain to vest within the life
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of the person living at the time the interest is created,
plus twenty-one years.84 Until the Rule Against Perpetui
ties, an estate could be created which was in essence
nondestructible, and hence, the title to the estate was
vague.
Before an assessment of the Statute of Uses can be
completed, it is imperative to consider the types of convey
ances through uses which were regulated by the statute
and their effects upon English law.

The three types of

conveyances not covered by the statute are active uses,
uses declared in chattel interests, and uses upon a use.
Active uses were not placed under the jurisdiction of the
Statute of Uses because the feoffee did not merely serve as
a conduit in this transfer; rather, he performed active
duties.

For an active use to arise, the feoffee must be

entrusted with a responsibility such as conveying land,
collecting rents, or protecting the property.

The allow

ance for the active use to operate outside of the Statute
of Uses enabled land to be conveniently transferred for

.
. .
administrative
purposes. 85

Uses declared in chattel inter-

ests were not covered by the statute because the statute
requires that seisin be passed from the feoffer to the
feoffee to the cestui que use, and a person cannot be seised
of a chattel.

Therefore, the legal title to the chattel

will vest in the person to whom it is transferred regardless
of an expression of intent to create a use.86 The most
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important type of transfer not covered by the statute is the
use upon a use.

A use upon a use could be raised by John

enfeoffing Tim in fee simple, to the use of Martin in fee
simple, to the use of Frances in fee simple.

Immediately

after the Statute of Uses the courts would declare that the
legal title belonged to Hartin and that the use in Frances
was void.

This doctrine was firmly established in Tyrrel's

Case (1557) where the Court of Wards, with the sanction of
the judges of the Court of Connnon Pleas, ruled that the
second use was null.87 The Chancery did not interfere with
the ruling on the use upon a use for about one hundred
years; but by the middle of the Seventeenth century, Chan
cery began to consistently enforce the equitable interest
of the second cestui que use when precedent for the support
of the equitable interests of the second cestui que use
was established in Sambach v. Dalston (1637).88 Thus, we
have a situation similar to that before the enactment of
the Statute of Uses as the equitable and legal titles of
ownership once again may be separated through the use upon
a use.

The Chancery's enforcement of the use upon a use

signals the beginning of a new era in the evolution of the
law of property as the use upon a use is the foundation of
the modern trust.

The· trust is created in much the same

way as a use; the only difference is that the feoffee of
uses is now termed the trustee, and the cestui que use is
now called the beneficiary.89
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In final analysis, the Statute of Uses did not fully
attain the intended purpose of the Crown.

Henry VIII was

not able to perpetuate total collection of feudal incidents,
and as a result, had to revert to a more moderate fraction
of one-third of the incidents.

In order to enforce the

collection of tenure, Henry had to establish the Court of
Wards whose administrative cost further depleted his oargin
of profit from feudal revenue.

Due to the administrative

functions of the Court of Wards, and to the provision that
monastic lands he sold as tenants-in-chief, the net income
from feudal incidents rose from

4,434 in 1542 to an

average of only

7,700 per annum in the first three years
90
Henry VIII did accomplish the
of reign of Edward VI.
union of equitable and legal titles of ownership through
the Statute of Uses during his reign, but less than a cen
tury later, the use upon a use effectively separated these
titles in a manner similar to conveyances to uses before
the statute.

The Statute of Enrollments neither insured

the simplification of the law of property, nor eliminated
secret conveyances as methods such as the lease-release
were soon instituted as a means to avoid the rather weak
statute.

Furthermore, Henry's elimination of all rights to

devise property by will contributed to the landowners' sup
port of the Pilgrimage of Grace.

The extreme reaction to

the Statute of Uses instigated the conception and passage
of the Statute of Wills.

Thus, Henry's attempts to secure

37
legislation over uses were only partially successful, and
his efforts yielded no substantial increase in royal
revenue.
Although the Statute of Uses did not realize its
desired end, it is still of extreme significance to English
law.

The Statute of Uses is exemplary of the unplanned

growth of legislation as the statute served to create,
expand and interpret many areas of law including Property,
Contracts, Future Interests, Wills and Trusts. While estab
lishing the modern day conception of real property, the
statute introduced a much needed elasticity into the connnon
law by legitimatizing new ways to transfer land such as the
conveyance to oneself, bargain and sale, covenant to stand
seised, and the lease-release.

These new methods of con

veyances could be transacted in a lawyer's office and did
not require physical entry upon the land.

Therefore, they

have been termed "the catalysts which called forth the
modern deed.1191 Although the Statute of Enrollments did
not comprehensively eliminate the ability to perpetrate
fraud or secret conveyances, it did provide a mechanism
through which these deeds could be registered and made
legally binding.

The Statute of Uses also introduced into

the connnon law the ability to create interests in future.
These conveyances, termed springing and shifting interests,
enabled estates to be created at a future date, upon the
occurrence of a future event, or to transfer estates from
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one holder to another at a future time.

Initially, they

allowed land to be held in perpetuity, but this defect was
corrected in 1681 when the Rule Against Perpetuities was
conceived in the Duke of Norfolk's Case.

The Statute of

Wills is significant because it marks the first time in
modern English history that real property could be devised
by common law.

The Statute of Wills provided for the cre

ation of springing and shifting executionary interests
analogous to springing and shifting interests.

The doctrine

of powers of appointment and revocation stemmed from and
strengthened the effects of this statute.

Finally, a defect

in the Statute of Uses, its failure to regulate a use upon
a use, became the foundation of the modern law of trusts.
The slow evolution of the use upon a use until the rights
of the second cestui que use became protected by Chancery
in the middle of the seventeenth century forms an exciting
study in the growth of legislation itself.

In short, the

Statute of Uses signifies the beginning of a new epoch of
property law.

The medieval conceptions of prerogative own

ership and wardship were destroyed, and the modern concep
tion of pr�vate property was created as a result of the
Statute of Uses.

The Statute of Uses led to the abolition

of the tenure system in England, and to the institution of
land conveyances which provided for fluid and efficient
buying, selling, and disposing of real estate,

Thus, the

Statute of uses has been considered by many as, ''perhaps
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the most important addition that the legislature has ever
made to our private law.1192 Although Henry VIII may have
wished that he had never spent the later half of his reign
striving to achieve control over uses through legislation
and then trying to minimize the undesirable effects of the
Statute of Uses through further legislation, the modern
landowner has much to be grateful to Henry for because the
advent of the Statute of Uses is the cornerstone of the
modern interpretation of property rights and privileges.

FOOTNOTES
1
Thomas E. Atkinson, Law of Wills (St. Paul: West
Publishing Company, 1953), pp. 11-12.
2
0ther similar forI!l.s such as junior right existed but
their use was not widespread.
3Atkinson, p. 13.

4
w. S. Holdsworth, A Histor of En lish Law, vol. IV
(Boston: Little and Brown, 1924 t , p. 4y4.
5
Atkinson, p. 15. At this time liberty of testation
was allowed on one-third of one's chattels if one supported
a wife and a child. If a man supported only a wife or a
child, then he could transfer one-half of his personal
property through testament. It was possible for a man with
no dependents to will all of his personal property.
6Holdsworth, p. 422. A feoffor would normally enfeoff
several persons as it minimized the risk of fraud. Further
more, if the feoffee died, the estate to which he was
enfeoffed would be liable to dower and feudal incidents.
7 Cornelius J. Moynihan, Introduction to the Law of
Real Property (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1962),p. 177.
8Before the Statute of Uses it was held that upon
feoffment a use resulted in the absence of any consideration
or declaration of a use. After the statute a use would
result from feoffment, fine, or recovery, and the use would
be executed by the statute. The modern resulting trust is
not executed by the Statute of Uses.
9Moynihan, p. 176.

l
OHoldsworth, p. 175.
11 Holdsworth, p. 442.
12 Theodore F. T. Plunknett, A Concise Histor of the
Connnon Law (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, l956) ,
pp. 576-577.
13Plunknett, p. 577.

14William E. Burby, Handbook of the Lm,� of Real Prop
erty (St. Paul: West Publishing Co.), 1965, p. 7.

41
15

Herbert Thorndike Tiffany, The Law of Real Property,
Third Edition (Chicago: Callaghan and Company, 1939),
pp. 391-92.
16Burby, p. 8. "Successive joint tenancies could be
created to prevent inheritance of the legal ownership."
17
Melville Madison Bigelow, The Law of Wills (Boston:
Little, Brown, and Company, 1898), p. 27.
18Tiffany, p. 392.
19
Moynihan, p. 175.
20
Holdsworth, p. 419.
21
Plunknett, p. 579.
22
Holdsworth, p. 449.
23Bigelow, pp. 25-26.

24Plunknett, p. 583.
25
E. W. Ives, "The Genesis of the Statute of Uses,"
English Historical Review No. 325 (October 1967), p. 673.
26
w. S. Holdsworth maintains that the 1529 draft bill
proposing that for all persons other than peers, estates
were to be held in fee simple and enrolled by an officer of
the Court; and the separate agreement between the Crown and
the nobility, which Holdsworth dates as being signed in
1529, were parts of an ill-fated compromise between the
Crown and nobility enacted by the Crown to secure control
over uses. This attempt was futile because it alienated
the two largest groups in the House of Conrrnons, the untitled
gentry and the connnon lawyers. After another unsuccessful
attempt to pass his proposals in 1532, Henry VIII endeavored
to enlist the support of the common lawyers. Henry sup
posedly gained the support of conrrnon lawyers by first
frightening them by sympathetically listening to an attack
against the chicanery of the conrrnon lawyers and against the
expense, delay, and injustice of the conrrnon law courts. The
lawyers, fearful of radical reforms which might be enacted
against their profession and also jealous of the profitable
jurisdiction over property which the Chancery enjoyed, grad
ually began to side with the king. With the support of the
lawyers, Holdsworth claims that the Statute of Uses was
passed and, "if this be so, the action of the conrrnon lawyers
has had large effect upon the form which the Statute of Uses
and the Statute of Enrollments finally assumed, and, conse
quently, upon the whole of the future history of the law of
real property."

42
27

Holdsworth, p. 450.

28Holdsworth, pp. 450-51 and Plunknett, p. 583.
29rves, p. 678.

30Ives, pp. 676-679.
31stanford E. Lehmberg, The Reformation Parliament
1529-1536 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970),
p. 95.
32J. M. W. Bean, The Decline of English Feudalism
1215-1540 (New York: Manchester University Press, 1968),
p. 265ff. Mr. Bean asserts that Holdsworth's dating of the
agreement between the king and the nobility is faulty.
Holdsworth states that both the draft bill and the compro
mise were submitted to Parliament in 1529, and then were
resubmitted in 1532. Mr. Bean shows that the compromise
could not have been introduced by 1529, and he posits that
the compromise was gradually signed between 1529 and 1531.
33Lehmberg, The Reformation Parliament, p. 95.
34Bean, p. 264.
35Bean, p. 267.
36Lehmberg, The Reformation Parliament, p. 134.
37 Holdsworth, p 453.
.
38 rves, p. 683.

39rves, p. 689.
40rves, p. 688.
41 rves, p. 685.

42Bean, p. 283.
43Bean, p. 275.
44Bean, p. 284.

45Holdsworth, p. 453. A third draft bill dealing with
uses was submitted to Parliament in 1536. This bill would
have eliminated many of the fraudulent practices which
could be perpetrated through uses, but at the same time, it
would have subjected the use to many of the rules of connnon
law, thus eliminating the beneficial elements of conveyancing

43
inherent in the use. The draft bill would have also elim
inated many of the advantages which the Crown stood to gain
due to control of uses as it allowed for the retention of
the power of devise and it limited the effect of recovery.
The compromising nature of this bill leads William Holdsworth
to believe that it was conceived as a desperate attempt by
the landowners to maintain some of their rights under the
former system of uses, and that the bill was probably never
seriously considered by the Crown.
46Ives, p. 691.
47Holdsworth, p. 467.
48Holdsworth, p. 460.
49Lehmberg, The Reformation Parliament, p. 237.

SOHoldsworth, p. 460.
51Moynihan, p. 176.

52John E. Cribbet, Princi les of the Law of Property
(Meneola: Foundation Press, 1 � 75), p. 72.
53Bean, pp. 286-87 and Holdsworth, p. 462.

54Bean, pp. 286-87 and Holdsworth, p. 462.
55some conveyances such as a use upon a use, an active
use, and possession of real and personal chattels in use
were not subject to the Statute of Uses.
56Holdsworth, p. 462 and Tiffany, pp. 399-400.
57Holdsworth, p. 459.
58Bean, p. 272.

59Ives, pp. 686-87.
60Holdsworth, p. 461.

61Bean, p. 294.
62Holdsworth,
pp. 464-65.
63stanford E. Lehmberg, The Later Parliaments of Henry
VIII 1536-1547 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1977), p. 98.
64Holdsworth, p. 465.

44
65A k.
t 1.nson, p. 18.
66Bean, p. 194.

67Lehmberg, The Later Parliaments of Henry VIII, p. 99.
68Lewis H. Simes, Handbook of the Law of Future
Interests (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1966), p. 11.
69 Holdsworth, p. 475.
70Holdsworth, p. 424.
71Holdsworth, p. 425.
72Tiffany, pp. 399-400.

73cribbet, p. 75.
74william Walsh, Cormnentaries on the Law
_erty (New York: Matthew Bender an
7 , p.
75Holdsworth, p. 425.

76Holdsworth, p. 425.
77Holdsworth, p. 426.
78Lewis M. Simes and Allan F. Smith, The Law of Future
Interests (St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1956), p. 36.
79simes, Handbook of the Law of Future Interests, p. 11.

80simes and Smith, The Law of Future Interests, p. 38.
81simes and Smith, The Law of Future Interests, p. 348.
82simes and Smith, The Law of Future Interests, p. 349.
83cribbet ' p. 116.

84 cribbet

' p. 117.
85simes, Handbook of the Law of Future Interests, p. 9.
86simes, Handbook of the Law of Future Interests, p. 9.
87Holdsworth, p 467.
.
88Moyn1.'han, p. 205.

89Moynihan, p. 205.
90P. W. Williams, The Tudor Regime (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1979), p. 64.
91cribbet, p. 113.
92Holdsworth, p. 409.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Atkinson, Thomas E. Law of Wills.
ing Company, 195 .

St. Paul:

West Publish

An essential source for the history of the differ
entiation of real and personal property in England and
the genesis of the will from the Anglo-Saxon era to
modern times.
Bacon, Sir Francis. Law Tracts.
and R. Gosling, 1937.

London:

E. and R. Nutt

Bacon's reading on the Statute of Uses is of
immense historical interest. Bacon provides one of
the earliest recorded explications of the statute.
Bean, J. M. W.
New York:

The Decline of English Feudalism, 1215-1540.
Manchester University Press, 1968.

Bean's chapter 6, entitled "The Royal Prerogative
1529-1540: from Victory to Compromise," is perhaps
the most detailed history of the period which is uti
lized in this paper. The stronger points of this
chapter include Bean's correction of the dating of the
compromise between the Crown and nobility, his refu
tation of Holdsworth's thesis of the Statute of Uses
being a product of an agreement between the Crown and
the connnon lawyers, his explication of the Dacre case,
and his interpretations of the Statute of Uses and the
Statute of Wills.
Bigelow, Henry H. Cases and Materials on Rights in Land.
St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1945.
Contains an informative section on the development
of the use upon a use into the modern trust.
Bigelow, Melvin Madison. The Law of Wills. Boston: Little
and Brown, 1898.
Bigelow's work is valuable in studying the conunon
law court's refusal to recognize the cestui que use and
the consequent protection of the cestui que use by the
Chancery.
Burby, William E. Handbook of the Law of Real Property.
St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1965.
A brief explication of the situation prior to the
Statute of Uses, the methods of creating a use, the

46

enforcement of the use, and the Statute of Uses and
its importance in modern law.
Cribbet, John E. Principles of the Law of Property.
Mineola: Foundation Press, 1975.
Cribbet feels that the Statute of Uses was not
successful in its primary aim of securing a source of
royal revenue, but that the unforseen consequences of
the statute, especially the creation of new estates in
land, the origin of new modes of conveyancing, and the
rise of the modern trust, are perfect examples of the
unplanned growth of English law.
Holdsworth, W. S. A History of English Law, vol. IV.
Boston: Little and Brown, 1934.
Mr. Holdsworth offers by far the most detailed
and widely used interpretation of the Statute of Uses.
Although Holdsworth's account of the formative period
of the statute (1529-1536) has been recently revised,
and his conclusion of the long term ramifications of
the statute is too general, Holdsworth presents the
most comprehensive analysis of the effects of the
Statute of Uses on English law. His book is necessary
to any complete study of the Statute of Uses.
Ives, E. W. "The Genesis of the Statute of Uses." The
English Historical Review. 325 (October 1967).-Mr. Ives' article presents the first challenge
to the Holdsworth thesis in over four decades. Using
materials unknown to Holdsworth, Ives contends that
the Statute of Uses was a result of the decision in
the Dacre case, royal persuasion of the Chancery to
rule against uses, and cooperation of the connnon law
judges and sergeants at law. Ives feels that the
overbearing terms of the Statute of Uses were imposed
due to Henry's shortsightedness, and of the compromise
between the Crown and the nobility, Ives deals with
the social and political effects of the statute, but
he does not deal with the statute's legal ramifica
tions. He concludes that the Statute of Uses "was an
extremist act, carried by force majeure in a moment
of opportunism but rapidly abandoned in the face of
determined opposition" (p. 697). Mr. Ives' most
informative revision of Holdsworth's thesis has been
accepted by historians such as J. M. W. Bean and Stan
ford E. Lehmberg.

47
Lehmberg, Stanford E. The Reformation Parliament 1529-1536.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970.
Lehmberg's work offers a most concise synthesis
of Ives' and Holdsworth's research on the Statute of
Uses.
The Later Parliaments of Henry VIII 1536-1547.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.
This book contains a summary of the events
leading to the passage of the Statute of Wills. Lehm
berg points out that the Statute of Wills increased
the jurisdiction of the common law courts by depriving
ecclesiastical courts of probate jurisdiction over
devises of land.
Maitland, Fredrick William. Equity.
University Press, 1936.

Cambridge:

Cambridge

Equity is composed of a series of lectures deliv
ered by Mr. Maitland. This work includes his classic
interpretation that the Statute of Uses "was forced
upon an extremely unwilling Parliament by an· extremely
strong willed King" (34). E�uity is beneficial in
studying the legal backgroun of the modern trust as
affected, or more appropriately, not affected by the
Statute of Uses.
Moynihan, Cornelius J. Introduction to the Law of Real
Property. St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1962.
Moynihan briefly relates the historical background
of the controversy over uses, and he provides an elabo
rate analysis of the legal effects of the Statute of
Uses and the Statute of Wills.
Plunknett, Theodore F. T. A Concise History of the Common
Law. Boston: Little and Brown, 1956.
Mr. Plunknett supports the Holdsworth thesis most
vehemently where Holdsworth has been proven wrong by
more modern historians. Although Plunknett's interpre
tation is outdated, his work provides a good history of
the Statute of Uses.
Simes, Lewis H. Handbook of the Law of Future Interests.
St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1966.
Mr. Simes offers a well written account of the
executory interests introduced into the conunon law by
the Statute of Uses and the Statute of Wills. Simes

48

also traces the effects of conveyances not covered by
the Statute of Uses and discerns their importance in
forming modern law.
Simes, Lewis H., and Smith, Allan F. The Law of Future
Interests. St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1956.
Simes and Smith present a well outlined summary
of the inadequacy of property law prior to the advent
of the Statute of Uses. This summary is followed by
a brief exegis of the statute and an enumeration of
its effects. The authors also comment upon the Statute
of Wills and discuss the nature of family settlements
through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

1.

Tiffany, Herbert Thorndike. The Law of Real Propert
Third Edition. Chicago: Callaghan & Company, 939.
The Law of Real Property is a consise and
detailed interpretation of the new forms of land con
veyance initiated by the Statute of Uses and Statute
of Wills. Although difficult to read, this book pro
vides an inclusive outline of both what the Statute of
Uses accomplished and what it failed to accomplish.
Walsh, William. Commentaries on the Law of Real Property.
New York: Matthew Bender and Co., 1947.
Walsh's main objective is to trace the origin of
the modern property deed to the Statute of Uses. His
explication of conveyances of property before and after
the Statute of Uses is lucid and informative.
Williams, P. W. The Tudor Regime.
Press, 1979.

Oxford:

Clarendon

Williams combines sound scholarship
torical insight in his interpretation of
istrative strategy. The author provides
brief information on the Statute of Uses
Statute of Wills.

and sharp his
Tudor admin
factual but
and the

